immigration to maintain the economic viability of Switzerland (Office fédéral de la statistique 1996, Münz and Ulrich 2001) .
In addition to the occasional trans-border references to be mentioned as outlined above, two further European discourse dimensions have to be incorporated in order to be able to provide a fuller picture of the elements at play in the texts to be investigated. I shall refer to changes recently observed in the post-cold-war security discourse of NATO and to the Europe-wide discourse of globalisation and competition in the business sphere, which, as will be seen, also influences the way in which the state is conceptualised. It will not be argued that there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the shifted security discourse emanating from the powerful international organisation which is NATO (and particularly as Switzerland is not a member, -though benefiting significantly from its activities), but the topoi observable in connection with non-citizens are such that the point of view will be presented that there is now an observable interpenetration of the new security discourse with the migration and foreigner discourse, which adds weight to certain xenophobic strands of the latter.
The aims of the analysis are thus to demonstrate how these two other discourses have invaded that of migration and identity, how foreigners are presented and operationalised within this simultaneity of discourses, and finally to comment on some of the implications of the mingling of these different discursive practices.
One fundamental thing to be made clear, is that the discourse is really not about immigration in the normal English sense of the term. In my view what is present here is a labour-market and foreigner management discourse, underlined by its being based on the idea of the commodification of workers frequently, or even normally, referred to in terms of their abilities rather than as persons (e.g. "die besten Köpfe", "Arbeitskräfte", "des personnes hautement qualifiées (dont on a un urgent besoin)", or as "Zuwanderer" in purely economic terms for the benefit of the autochthonous in-group. The negative results of the two referenda on 26 September 2004 on federal government proposals to change the constitution to place the naturalisation process under federal (rather than cantonal or local) control in order to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship by "foreigners of the second and third generation" demonstrate the extent to which the population as a whole is unwilling to consider native-born and permanently-resident foreigners (as opposed to refugees temporarily admitted Switzerland) as immigrants with easy access to citizenship.
1
In addition, the valuable commodity of non-citizen labour is always referred to as something which "we", the national in-group, control and regulate for "our" advantage:
"Zuwanderer" or "Arbeitskräfte" are never active; they receive the actions of others.
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Secondly, and this arises in part from the point just made about the exercise of power, the foreigner management discourse is inseparable from the national or in-group identity discourse. The verbal acts represented by the statements to be investigated have taken place at a time of radical political shifts in Europe and bear the unmistakable, but perhaps unexpected, marks of these shifts. It is my view that the Swiss discourse, and hence thought patterns, are demonstrably European, not confined to one relatively small country, and are representative of more general tendencies.
The Post-Cold-War Security Discourse
What I wish to argue first is that elements in the Swiss (and European) foreignermanagement discourse of the early twenty-first century reflect important features of the new European security discourse of the 1990's. NATO, it should be remembered, is a community representing shared European and North-American values which has come together to defend these values against whatever is perceived as threatening them. Its statements on its defensive mission in the new circumstances at the end of the twentieth century are therefore part of a broader pan-European identity discourse. And one of the things I wish to suggest is that the national identity discourses within individual states (as represented by their political parties) are also becoming, in some measure, more panEuropean -even when the parties are anti-EU, as in the case of the SVP / UDC, somewhat essentialist, as in the case of the CDU/CSU, or strongly pro-EU, as represented by the ÖVP.
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In the new NATO discourse the following elements are to be found (Schäffner 2002 ): a) there is a "danger" / "problem " / "challenge" which comes solely from outside: from outsiders, their values and their activities; b) foreigners bring (organised) crime -and control the drug trade; c) there are complex new risks arising from ethnic conflicts, economic breakdown, and political collapse; d) there is the strong possibility of unchecked population movements; above all the movement of refugees, and these movements endanger internal social, financial, and political stability; e) there is a direct security threat, i.e. open violence; f) the danger / problem / challenge is now multi-polar.
Globalisation Discourse
The increasingly frequent use of "Globalisierung" is a phenomenon of the nineties. The archives of the Institut für deutsche Sprache in Mannheim make this clear for German (Teubert 2002) , and given the origin of the term in the late eighties, the development of the French term "mondialisation" cannot be significantly different.
The globalisation discourse, too, arose in the same period. On the surface, the globalisation model represents an overcoming of the bi-polarity of the world present in the cold-war rhetoric. But underneath, there is also a competition model, multipolarlike that of the new security discourse, but here it is business against business, country against country. It contains such foundation concepts as "competition", "competitivity" nation and business.
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First I shall examine Ruth Metzler-Arnold's speech which, while given at a party congress, is aimed at the electorate as a whole. She was speaking also as a representative of the Federal Council, presenting its viewpoint and recommendations to the country.
Her speech also clearly reflects the consensual political and business discourses of the period on this issue, in which there was no dissenting voice except for the Greens who resigned from the all-party grouping opposing the referendum -not because they supported the "Yes" vote, but because they were appalled at the complete commodification of migrants.
Switzerland in Business Discourse
The first and paramount point here is the naming of the country in purely business terms.
On four occasions the minister refers to "la place économique suisse" (twice) "la place économique et industrielle suisse", and "notre place économique" -[the best English equivalent would be: "Switzerland as a place of business", "the Swiss business environment", and "our business environment"]. Business is the unifying feature which covers all the disparate regions, languages, traditions, and confessions of Switzerland.
The conflation of business environment for country in this speech is a particular example of a systematic practice on the part of the Swiss Government in public documents and pronouncements. 6 The frequent use of the first person plural "nous", "notre" in connection with the area of the Swiss economy and business activity confirms and reinforces the phenomenon just mentioned: business and the resulting prosperity are the principal and common characteristics of the confederation and the nation.
It is therefore fully consistent with the presentation of Switzerland predominantly as a business unit and through the conflation of party, people, and government resulting from "nous" and "notre", that the vast majority of positive references to non-Swiss are made in economic terms; and of these a significant number of references also uses the first-person plural: for example, "ouvrir nos frontières à des personnes hautement qualifiées", and, three times, with only very slight variations "les étrangers hautement qualifiés dont nous avons un urgent besoin". This three-times repeated statement that "we need . . . " with the implication that "we" will permit them to enter, places the foreigners in the service of the controllers and beneficiaries of "la place économique suisse". The specific mention that non-EU and non-EEA nationals will be allowed in only if their presence is "indispensable" i.e., if we absolutely cannot do without them, makes the relation very clear. They are a group from whom economic advantage is to be gained.
A significant element in this business discourse is the mention of multinationals.
Their presence in Switzerland is to be protected and their implantation encouraged. There is an unquestioning acceptance of a direct link between prosperity and multinationals, and consequently there is also an implicit argument that the more of them there are, the higher prosperity will rise. An explicit argument is that of the absolute flexibility of multinationals: they will go, and quickly, wherever labour market conditions suit them.
This situation is presented as if it were a natural law. Consequently, the Swiss government has no choice but to obey this "law" and to submit itself to the pattern of behaviour of the multinationals. The "omnipotence" of multinationals is constructed as matched only by the "impotence" of the nation state when faced with them. This view is not defended or argued. It is asserted as a fact. Consequently the explicit threat-topos (the multinationals will leave if you vote "yes") is all the stronger. But to keep the multinationals in the country, there must be an adequate supply of skilled labour which Switzerland itself cannot provide.
The argumentation implicit in the speech is the following: a victory of the "Yes" vote in the referendum will harm business and prosperity; business and prosperity are the central and unifying characteristics of Switzerland; therefore to vote "Yes" is an antiSwiss act. This demonstrates the potential power of the conflation of the discourses of business (which is now inevitably global) and of national identity for an individual or party who knows how to use it. At first sight this might appear paradoxical, as it is often stated that globalisation is leading to a reduction in the importance of individual nation states and that the discourse of business deconstructs these states (e.g. Wodak 2000) . But on the level of rhetoric the reverse is the case. As here, parties are incorporating significant elements of the discourse of business in their public statements on identity.
The Discourse on Foreigners in Switzerland
The positive presentation of non-Swiss in the workforce is inseparable from the presentation of Switzerland as a prosperous business entity. Four other aspects need particular mention: refugees, anti-foreigner topoi, the terms for the presentation of nonSwiss, including the use "étranger", and the discourse of "integration".
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Refugees They are presented in a discourse of a national humanitarian tradition and of international humanitarian responsibilities. However, on each occasion that © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 10 refugees are mentioned, the statement is made that their stay is temporary and that, after the emergency has passed, they will be returned home (the passive voice is used, with all its implications). On one occasion a term is used drawn from the discourse of business:
"réinsertion". Implicit in the argument is the view that refugees as a class cannot possess the qualities needed to be useful members of the Swiss population and workforce.
Anti-foreigner topoi These are to be found at the beginning, the middle, and the end of the speech. The minister begins by referring to "frequent" media reports of criminal acts committed by foreigners and continues with references to schools with a high proportion of foreign children, and to workplace insecurity resulting from the presence of foreign workers. By stating that the government (le Conseil fédéral) is aware of these "fears and complaints" and takes them seriously, she gives governmental approval and credence to the reports. Similarly, the references at the end of the speech to the same topoi as were mentioned initially and to "abuses of existing legislation" (which the government is curbing through the new Foreigners' Act, for which this minister is responsible) reinforce a negative image of foreigners. In addition, it must be noted that this is based on an uncontested negative representation of others and the exploitation of hostile topoi in the popular and media discourse on foreigners.
Foreigners At the same time, it emerges that there are two classes of non-Swiss.
The positively loaded group are those who are already contributing, or who in the future will contribute, to national and individual prosperity and the model of Switzerland as a prosperous business environment. It is clear that potentially these include all citizens of the European Union (and of the European Economic Area), to whom the right of abode and work in Switzerland will be granted after a transition period provided for in the © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 11 treaties linking Switzerland to the EU and its member states. Only selected persons from other countries belong to this group if they fill an "urgent need" (it will be recalled that this is a quotation) in "la place économique et industrielle suisse". This leads to the question of when is a non-Swiss not a "foreigner".
8 What I
argue is happening here is a reduction of intra-European marks of distinction along lines which conform to the discourse of business and prosperity. The minister systematically makes a terminological distinction between "étrangers" (foreigners) and "ressortissants de l'UE" (nationals of the EU). Twice she says these "EU nationals" will be admitted without further formalities or checks. Immediately following the second of these two examples, the term "ressortissant" is employed for non-EU/EEA citizens, but in a context of significant positive representation: "L'admission de ressortissants d'États nonmembres de l'UE et de l'AELA sera strictement limitée à la main-d'oeuvre hautement qualifiée, dont l'engagement se révèle indispensable". It appears that "ressortissants"
with its accompanying social and economic upgrading is employed here because of these individuals' being "hautement qualifiés". Earlier, the minister had referred to "personnes hautement qualifiées recrutées dans des pays non-membres de l'UE ou de l'Aire Européenne de Libre Échange" Here, as they are "hautement qualifiées" these foreigners become "personnes" or "ressortissants", rather than "étrangers". In this positive evaluation of their contribution to Swiss business and prosperity it is as if highlyqualified people from outside the EU become honorary EU or EEA citizens.
Integration It is necessary to add to these analyses a brief consideration of the discourse of integration. "Étranger(s)" ("foreign", "foreigner") is, with a total of 41 occurrences for "étranger" and 6 for "étrangère", after the plural pronouns "we", "us", © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 12 "our" (62 occurrences in total : "nous" 38, "notre" 15, "nos" 9), the single most frequent word in the speech. The minister builds the whole speech round the structural opposition of "them" and "us". One strand of the European identity-and foreigner-discourse is that of "integration", a term without which no European political party (including those on the extreme right, who reject it) can function at present. 9 In this speech « intégration » -used twelve times -is presented as a guarantee of social stability and harmony through the reduction of difference. Very briefly, its functions are the following: 5. At the same time it distracts from the issues arising from the admission by the minister that the federal government is not in control of population movements which are, she says, subject to the irresistible demands of the economy and the multinationals.
© Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 13
At the same time, one is able to see in this appeal to the public by the minister features of the shifted security discourse which had evolved in the nineteen-nineties, as also evidence of the globalisation discourse. The former is represented principally by the representation of the threat to Swiss stability and identity coming not from foreign states but from foreign persons, who are linked to crime and who present problems arising from their alien values and behaviour patterns. And while a major part of the speech focusses on the labour market and its needs for the inward movement of skilled workers, it also incorporates xenophobic statements on foreigners, who in turn are linked to assertions of threats to domestic stability and wellbeing. The globalisation discourse is present in the linking of Swiss identity to the business environment and the competition topos within the globalisation discourse, and particularly to the mobility of large multi-national corporations which, it is asserted, will leave if their competitive position is threatened by a lack of sufficient highly-skilled labour. Thus the inward migration of labour is simultaneously both a necessity and a threat.
As mentioned above, for the federal election of 2003 I am considering only the four parties already represented in the Federal Council and which were also likely to continue to form (and did continue to form) this joint executive at the pinnacle of the state. In the discourse(s) of migration (or really, labour market and foreigner management) and identity within the official party platforms in general, two groupings are necessary: the SVP / UDC on the one hand, and the remaining parties on the otherthough one can perceive how the CVP / PDC (which felt itself endangered by the SVP / UCD) was being pushed -particularly in the area of migration and foreigners. However, and it is important, all parties accept the obligations of the existing treaties linking © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 14 Switzerland to the EU, which, among other things, provide for free movement of labour after a transition period. Information will be drawn and evidence will be given from the German-language or the French-language versions of the manifestos indifferently, as there is no divergence between the two. This phenomenon indicates that, despite differences in attitudes and voting patterns in the target audiences (for instance, in the referenda mentioned above, the French-speaking cantons supported the proposed changes to the naturalisation process), on the level of these written statements the discourse was uniform, at least for these two language groups which make up approximately ninety percent of Swiss citizens. On the other hand, the other parties use "Zuwanderung", "Zuwanderer", and even "Einwanderung". For the CVP / PDC the former occurs in collocations with "beschränken" / "minimieren" / "Grenzen setzen" / "wird kontrolliert" but all of these imply that there will be inward migration. The other parties used the terms in collocations indicating restrictions for those coming from outside the EU / EEA countries. The FDP / PRD speaks openly of inward migration even going so far as to use © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 16
"Einwanderung" and "Einwanderer", but links this overtly and consistently to the development of national (Swiss) interests, as an instrument for the promotion of domestic prosperity (passim, pages 9-19 and 20) . This theme of the promotion of Swiss prosperity is shared by the CVP / PDC and SVP / UDC. In the latter case, the commodification of such migrants is extreme. The employment of foreign workers is to be linked to the (short-term) economic cycle, only temporary visas will be granted, and family members will be excluded. This will "promote economic growth, without increasing migration":
(Section "Ausländerpolitik" / "Politique des étrangers", p. 12 and 40). In her speech to the party and the public, and also in her German-language radio and television address on 9 September 2000 recommending rejection of the referendum question, and in the French-and German-language printed statements distributed at her press conference on 18 August 2000, the minister discursively constructed a homogenous national identity, that of prosperity resulting from intense, and globalised, business activity. But on the international level there can be no claim that this is the distinguishing mark of Swiss identity. Nor is any such claim made. Quite on the contrary, it is this quality of prosperity, explicitly due to technological advancement and business activity, which identifies Switzerland with the EU member states and makes it politically and logically acceptable to open Swiss borders to EU citizens who, significantly, she never referred to as "foreigners". Consequently, what we have here is also the discursive construction of an EU identity and the reduction of national differences within Europe © Robert Gould. Not for citation or distribution without permission of the author. 20 linked to prosperity resulting from intense business activity. With the four parties considered (though to a lesser extent for the SVP / UDC), the same practice of creating a systemic distinction between European (understood as EU-European plus EEA) and nonEuropean is clear.
The integration strand of the public political discourse of identity and immigration in Switzerland, and evident in the minister's speech on the one hand and the party manifestos on the other, has been rendered necessary because of the inward migration, largely in response to direct economic demand. It is likely that the strengthening of the neo-liberal discourse also present will lead, or even has led, to an intensification of the discourse of integration. Only in this way will it be possible for parties and governments to reconcile what they present as the economic imperatives driving them with the need to create among the electorate the conviction that they are able to deal with social issues.
Or, to re-state this, but from a slightly different point of view: in the public sphere a discourse of business which on one level deconstructs the role of the nation state (Wodak 2000 and Muntigl, Weiss, Wodak 2000) , is politically acceptable only if accompanied or counterbalanced by one which asserts the state's ability to deal with social issues, particularly with questions of social cohesion. The function is to persuade the electorate that the party (or government) can manage a situation which, because of the economic dimension, is outside the state's full control and places the country in a situation of dependence on outsiders of whom the common quality is that they have perceptibly different values.
